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Abstract
The pressure on tax haven countries to engage in tax information ex-
change shows rst e¤ects on capital markets. Empirical research suggests
that investors do react to information exchange and partially withdraw
from previous secrecy jurisdictions that open up to information exchange.
While some of the economic literature emphasizes possible positive e¤ects
of tax havens, the present paper argues that proponents of positive e¤ects
may have started from questionable premises, in particular when it comes
to the e¤ects that tax havens have for emerging markets like China and
India.
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1 The Current Crackdown on Tax Havens
The nancial crisis and the budgetary problems it implies for many governments
have led to an intensied search for additional tax revenues. Among other
things, the crisis triggered a strong interest in the activities of tax havens.
Partly, this may have been motivated by tax havens hosting of unregulated
shadow banking. To a large extent, however, the revived interest in the activities
of tax havens came from the fear of losing valuable tax revenues. This triggered
the G20 leaders in the midst of the crisis in 2009 to propose to "take action
against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens. We stand ready to
deploy sanctions to protect our public nances and nancial systems".1
The term "tax haven" is used in di¤erent ways by di¤erent authors, but usu-
ally the term refers to jurisdictions that impose no, or hardly any income taxes
on foreign investors. In addition, typical tax haven jurisdictions are reluctant
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to reveal tax relevant information about the income that foreign investors earn
in the respective tax haven. There are di¤erent lists of typical tax haven ju-
risdictions. Usually, small jurisdictions, like Andorra, the Bahamas, Barbados,
Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the British Channel
Islands, the Netherlands Antilles, or Panama, are prominent entries on these
lists. Somewhat larger countries such as Switzerland and Austria have been
qualied as well according to some lists. See Hebous (2014) for an overview.
Tax haven jurisdictions have been under pressure from various angles. Some
have criticized lack of nancial regulations in these countries. More relevant
for our discussion is a prominent attack which came from an initiative by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The es-
sential strategy, much intensied since 2008, was to greylist alleged tax haven
jurisdictions and to delist jurisdictions that agree on a standard of information
exchange and sign at least twelve bilateral tax information exchange agreements
(TIEAs). Since 2009, this initiative has led to an exploding number of TIEAs
that already exceeds 800 (OECD, 2013).2
The signing of a TIEA implies that a country can contact the tax authorities
of a partner country and ask for tax relevant information. Information must
not be denied just because the relevant information is not tax relevant in the
addressed country or because the tax payers behavior that is the request reason
is not an o¤ense in this country. On the other hand, a TIEA does not allow for
"shing expeditions" in which information on a large number of tax payers is
requested without giving individual reasons for the request.
If e¤ective, tax information exchange eliminates one of the two important
features of a tax haven: while the treaties do not eliminate the low or zero
taxation of income, they may eliminate the shelter that secrecy o¤ers for tax
evaders and tax avoiders.
A tax avoider seeks to reduce the tax burden by employing legally permitted
instruments, while a tax evader is in breach with existing tax law and may have
an even larger demand for secrecy. Yet, even a tax avoider may have a preference
for secrecy as the knowledge about tax loopholes may foster new tax legislation
to close the loophole.
The present paper evaluates some of the potential consequences that the
current crackdown on tax-haven secrecy may have. In particular, we comment
on the recent view that tax haven countries may have a positive role for other
countries as they help high-tax countries di¤erentiate their tax rates for di¤erent
mobile rms. Instead, the present paper suggests that for some countries rather
the opposite is plausible: tax-haven secrecy makes it harder to di¤erentiate
between domestic and foreign rms and therefore has a negative impact on non-
haven countrieswelfare. Consequently, a crackdown on secrecy should therefore
be benecial for these countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey describes the
2 It has been pointed out that one strategy of tax havens to keep their secrecy status could
have been to sign TIEAs primarily with other tax havens and countries of little economic
importance. Bilicka and Fuest (2014) show that this was not the case: in general, TIEAs were
formed between countries that have economic ties and sizable bilateral investment.
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di¤erent (shady) services that tax havens sometimes o¤er for investors. Sec-
tion 3 reviews recent papers on the impact of tax havens on other countries
welfare. Section 4 highlights the stunning importance of tax havens as con-
duit countries for investments into China and India. It also comments on the
possibility of round-tripping investments that may be included in these gures.
A round-tripping investment applies when the country of the ultimate owner
of the investment and the host country are identical, but the use of a conduit
country camouages the investment as a foreign direct investment (FDI). Sec-
tion 5 then o¤ers a revised version of the model by Hong and Smart (2010), [HS
(2010) in the following] and introduces round-tripping investment in a stylized
way. Section 6 concludes.
2 Services O¤ered by Tax Havens to Investors
Some of the advantages that tax haven jurisdictions o¤er to investors and tax
payers do not necessarily rely on secrecy. Several well-known tax avoidance
techniques by multinational enterprises (MNEs) simply take advantage of per-
manently low tax rates.3 There is ample empirical evidence on this in the
literature. MNEs may allocate liquid assets like patents (Karkinsky and Riedel,
2012) or nancial assets (Ruf and Weichenrieder, 2012) to subsidiaries in low
tax jurisdictions to reduce income taxes on the returns of these assets. Closely
related, MNEs may try to optimize by borrowing in high-tax countries, while
shifting equity and lending to high-tax subsidiaries into tax havens with zero, or
nearly zero corporate income taxes (Schindler and Schjelderup, 2012). MNEs
may also try to use adjustment of transfer prices on intra-rm trade to shift
prots to tax havens and low-tax jurisdictions more generally (Weichenrieder,
2009).
MNEs, however, may nevertheless benet from secrecy. Even if tax avoid-
ance schemes are legal under current legislation, publicity may still be disruptive
as it may trigger new anti-avoidance legislation. For this and other reasons, tax
haven a¢ liates may be used to obscure the intentions behind tax haven activi-
ties. Hebous (2014) suggests that German-owned subsidiaries in tax havens are
suspiciously often held indirectly via other intermediate a¢ liates. The creation
of such ownership chains may be explained by the desire to obscure tax haven
activities.
It has also been argued that secrecy may allow businesses to avoid liabil-
ity for environmental damages and other misconduct by obscuring ownership
(Schjelderup, 2011). For example, individuals and rms specializing in tele-
phone fraud or internet scams use tax haven operations to collect their booty
and to avoid the risk of reclaims. Sometimes tax and non-tax o¤enses may go
hand in hand. Sherman (2010) argues that o¤shore shell companies are often
used to obscure the bribes in the arms industry. Gordon (2009) describes how
3Low tax rates would be largely ine¤ective without the high political stability and good
governance that tax havens usually o¤er. The requirement of political stability means that
not all small jurisdictions can act as a successful tax haven (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009).
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resource extracting rms bribe government o¢ cials by using tax haven opera-
tions. Together with such evidences empirical study also shows German parent
companies that are invested in high corruption countries have a higher proba-
bility to own a tax haven operation than parents operating in a low-corruption
environment (Hebous and Lipatov, 2013).
Empirical studies that look at the e¤ects of tax information exchange on
the location choice of MNEs are still in their infancy. However, there is an
emerging of empirical evidences that secrecy matters not only for private port-
folio ows but also for foreign direct investments. Blonigen, Oldensky and Sly
(2014) look at U.S. tax treaties and nd that bilateral FDI in R&D intensive
industries may su¤er compared to other industries if a tax treaty is introduced.
The authors interpret this as an evidence of that transfer pricing strategies of
multinationals, which should be more important in R&D intensive sectors, may
be thwarted by information exchange that may be introduced by bilateral tax
treaties. Braun and Weichenrieder (2015) consider Germanys new bilateral
TIEAs and nd that, compared to a group of tax haven countries which did
not strike an agreement with Germany, tax haven countries that entered into
an agreement received less German investments over time. These studies sug-
gest that secrecy does matter for FDI, which may help to explain why previous
empirical studies have found it di¢ cult to show a positive e¤ect of bilateral tax
treaties on FDI (Bloningen and Davies, 2004). To the extent that these treaties
improve information exchange, the positive e¤ect due to lower withholding rates
and the elimination of double taxation may still be (partly) undone.
Of course, tax haven services are not only directed towards MNEs. Allegedly
on a more important scale, tax havens in the past may have helped private
individuals to hide their assets and income from their domestic tax authorities.
High prole cases where private individuals have invested large sums in tax
havens exist in many countries. For obvious reasons, secrecy is of essential
importance for this type of investors and, if at all, TIEAs should have an e¤ect
on assets allocation for them.
Johannesen and Zucman (2014) have recently looked at the available em-
pirical evidences. Their analysis shows that agreements on the exchange of
information led to a signicant shift in non-bank deposits (i.e. deposits that
are owned by non-banks) suggesting that tax evaders either move their de-
posits to tax havens that have no treaty with their respective home country
or at least show a preference for non-cooperative jurisdictions when it comes
to new investments. Hanlon, Maydew and Thornock (2015) nd evidence that
US TIEAs have reduced the use of respective tax havens by American portfolio
investors.
3 Services O¤ered to Other Countries
For readers that are non-native in the literature on tax havens it may come as a
surprise that a sizable academic literature is discussing possible positive e¤ects
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of tax havens on other countries. One claim that has been made (Hines, 2010) is
that other countries prot from nearby tax haven jurisdictions in terms of higher
economic growth. A possible transmission channel could be that investments in
tax havens allow rms to reduce their costs of capital when engaging in high-
tax countries (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2006a).4 While Desai, Foley and Hines
(2006b) nd that the demand for tax haven operations by U.S. MNEs increases
if a MNE operates in a high tax environment, the claim that this fosters growth
remains speculative.
Indeed, there are plausible arguments that point into the opposite direction.
In particular when it comes to developing countries, the availability of tax haven
secrecy may help corrupt politicians and administrators to loot the country and
to put the booty in secure places. This in turn will lead to a faster depletion
of a countrys natural resources (Konrad, Olsen and Schöb, 1994) and may in-
crease the return of illegal activities compared to legal activities (Torvik, 2009).
Slemrod and Wilson (2009) model tax competitions by introducing costly con-
cealment services from tax havens. They point out that small countries become
tax havens endogenously which will erode the tax base on non-haven countries,
intensify tax competition and distort optimal tax rates of non-haven countries.
Even partially elimination of large tax havens will increase social welfare.
However, there is another possibly benecial role of tax havens on other
countries that has been highlighted in the literature. The initial contribution
is by Keen (2001) who argues that in a setting of tax competition, in which
developed countries compete for a mobile tax base (i.e. rmsprots), prefer-
ential tax schemes and tax havens may cushion the e¤ects of tax competition
on tax revenues. HS (2010) put forward a related argument in a somewhat
di¤erent model. In both cases, the fundamental idea is that the availability of
special regimes or tax havens help high-tax countries to di¤erentiate their taxes
depending on the nature of the taxed rms, which is usually di¢ cult to achieve.
Immobile rms which serve the national markets nd it too costly to set up a
tax haven a¢ liate thus can be subjected to a high tax rate. Conversely, interna-
tionally mobile rms which would not pay this high tax rate and rather leave the
country may take advantage of tax havens and special regimes as instruments
to pay a lower tax and stay put. As a result, governments may be able to keep
the tax rate on immobile rms high and there is a theoretical possibility that
tax revenues of countries are higher than that in a situation in which tax havens
and special regimes are absent.5
The arguments putting forward depend on the assumption that high-tax
countries cannot di¤erentiate their taxes between mobile and immobile activities
and therefore some international avoidance schemes are necessary for achieving
4Another possible channel has been pointed out by Rose and Spiegel (2007). Relying on
international cross-country evidence these authors argue that empirically a countrys proximity
to a tax haven decreases the interest spread between bank lending and borrowing and decreases
market concentration among banks. As the authors point out, this may indicate that tax
havens increase the competitiveness of nearby banking. It seems also compatible, however,
with lower taxes on nearby banks.
5For a simple exposition see Dharmapala (2008).
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such a di¤erentiation. This is something that may be questioned. For example,
the UK patent box regime which is recently under renewed scrutiny provides a
lower tax rate to attract mobile capital which actually results in di¤erentiated
tax rates within high tax countries. Likewise, developing countries such as China
and India have promoted special economic zones which also often o¤er preferen-
tial tax schemes to multinational investors. In addition, the theoretical results
are not easily transferable to the question of whether the current crackdown on
tax havens is benecial or not. As emphasized above, tax information exchange
has implications for just one feature of tax havens: secrecy. The second charac-
teristic, zero/very low taxation, may still o¤er the di¤erentiation suggested by
HS (2010). As we will argue below, secrecy may matter if the assumption of
missing tax rate di¤erentiation by national governments is inappropriate.
4 Round-tripping and Secrecy
A striking common feature of the two most populated countries in the world,
China and India, is the ownership structure of their inward FDI stock. Figure
1 illustrates this observation for the year 2012. In the case of China, the second
largest investor after Hong Kong is the British Virgin Islands, a tax haven
jurisdiction with a number of some 30,000 inhabitants. In the case of India,
the single largest share of foreign investments comes from Mauritius, a country
with a population of 1.3 million that tops the UK and the US by a wide margin.
In both cases it is evident that these jurisdictions are mere conduit countries
for investments into China and India as domestic savings in these countries
are insu¢ cient to nance foreign acquisitions of these magnitudes. A similar
qualication applies to the role of Hong Kong for FDI in China.
A somewhat more di¢ cult question is the one about the ultimate investors
who use these conduit countries. In both cases it is conceivable that a large
part of the investments are not coming from abroad but originating from China
and India. Mauritius counts the highest share (42%) of FDI inows to India
accumulating from 2000 to 2011 (Department of Industrial Policy and Promo-
tion, country-wise FDI equity inows), which is viewed to be largely a conduit
for round-tripping investments beneting from a preferential double taxation
treaty. In the case of China, the World Bank (2002, p.41) has estimated the
fraction of round-tripping in Chinese inward investment at some 25% after re-
viewing previous papers and aggregated gures. Indirect empirical evidence for
round-tripping investment in China has recently been provided by Fuest and Li
(2015). The possible motivation for this round-tripping is preferential taxation
of foreign-owned rms compared to national rms, escaping from currency reg-
ulations that are applied di¤erentially to foreign and domestic-owned rms. In
addition, property rights may be generally better protected for foreign-owned
rms and miscellaneous legal and institutional settings could be avoid. As a
result, for example, Darius and Williams (1997) have argued that the return
of Hong Kong to China has led a large exodus of rms to the British Virgin
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Islands. Finally, routing via Hong Kong may allow Chinese rms to tap into
foreign capital markets (Xiao, 2004).
Table 1. Main Investor Countries, China and India (Stocks, 2012)
Main FDI investors in China Main FDI investors in India
1 Hong Kong, China 592.2 1 Mauritius 57.7
2 British Virgin Islands 129.4 2 United Kingdom 35.6
3 Japan 87.2 3 United States 32.6
4 US 70.2 4 Singapore 17.7
5 Singapore 59.2 5 Japan 15.5
6 Taiwan Province of China 57.0 6 Germany 12.6
7 Korea, Republic of 52.9 7 Switzerland 11.1
8 Cayman Islands 25.8 8 Netherlands 10.5
9 Samoa 19.9 9 France 3.8
10 Germany 19.8 10 Korea, Republic of 3.1
11 United Kingdom 17.7 11 Cyprus 2.5
12 Netherlands 12.8 12 Finland 1.6
13 France 11.5 13 Italy 1.3
14 Mauritius 11.5 14 United Arab Emirates 1.2
15 Macao, China 10.4 15 Sweden 1.1
16 Canada 8.3 16 Hong Kong, China 0.7
17 Malaysia 6.0 17 Belgium 0.7
18 Italy 5.5 18 Spain 0.7
19 Barbados 3.9 19 Denmark 0.6
20 Thailand 3.4 20 China 0.6
Total 1343.6 Total 218.1
Note: FDI gures (stocks) are in billion of US dollars. Source: Unctad, Bilateral FDI Statistics
2014, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx.
To the extent that di¤erential tax treatment between foreign and domes-
tically owned rms is one of the motives for round-tripping investments, the
availability of tax havens to obscure true ownership may impede the use of dif-
ferential taxation. In the past China has made use of measures to provide for
such a di¤erentiation, in particular before the tax reform in 2008 that ended a
preferential 15% tax rate for foreign-owned companies and introduced a com-
mon 25% rate for domestic and foreign rms. The o¢ cial purpose of the 2008
reform was to provide fair competition environment between domestic and for-
eign corporations, to safeguard tax sovereignty, and to improve Chinas economic
structure and promote development (the Enterprise Income Tax [EIT] Law of
the Peoples Republic of China, 2007; Shu, 2014). However, it has also been
argued that the EIT 2007 is to e¤ectively deal with the round-tripping invest-
ments of Chinese enterprises listed in Hong Kong and other tax havens, as their
income occurring inside China is now taxed at the same rate (Li, 2008).
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5 Modeling the Inuence of Tax Havens on Tax
Policy
In this section, we pick up the fact that some countries are in a position to
di¤erentiate their taxes between domestic rms and more mobile international
(foreign-owned) rms. Our focus is on analyzing how this inuences the welfare
implications of tax haven services. To do so we adapt the model by HS (2010).
Unlike done there, however, we assume that the government is able to di¤er-
entiate tax rates on mobile and immobile companies. Both rates are restricted
to be chosen between 0 and 1. As long as the tax rate tm which is applicable
for international rms is below the tax rate on national rms td (a constellation
that will be shown to be optimal below), domestic companies have an incentive
to hide via round-tripping, which is made possible through the secrecy of tax
havens. To model the implications of tax havens and their services for round-
tripping investment, suppose that domestic rms will take resort of a tax haven
with a probability p, where p is assumed to be an increasing function of the
number of available tax havens TH, i.e. p(TH). For simplicity, rms do not
su¤er additional costs when they make the decision to a tax haven and pretend
to be foreign-owned.
As mentioned above, there are two types of rms in the model. The output
of mobile international companies is F (Lm;K), which is a strictly concave,
constant returns of scale production function of labor Lm and capitalK. Capital
K for foreign-owned companies is obtained with a xed price r in the world
market. It is further assumed that labor is inelastically supplied and exibly
moving between domestic and foreign-owned rms, Both domestic labor Ld and
multinational labor Lm face the same wage rate w and the supply of total labor
is normalized to unity. With labor Ld and xed amount of capital D domestic
companies produce output G(Ld; D), which is also a strictly concave production
function with constant returns. Both mobile and immobile companies maximize
their net-of-tax prots while only labor is assumed to be tax deductible.
The objective function for mobile companies is:
(1  tm)[F (Lm;K)  wLm]  rK; (1)
Capital and labor demand of mobile rms are derived from the rst-order
conditions:
FL(Lm;K) = w; (2)
FK(Lm;K) =
r
1  tm = : (3)
The availability of tax haven services allows a fraction p of domestic rms
to disguise as international rms. Since capital D for domestic rms is xed,
immobile companies maximize their net-of-tax prots by:
(1  td)[G(Ld; D)  wLd](1  p(TH)) + (1  tm)[G(Ld; D)  wLd]p(TH); (4)
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where G(Ld; D)   wLd = (w) is the prots of immobile companies before
paying taxes. In our setup, only a fraction 1   p(TH) of domestic rms pay
corporate income tax td, while the rest are able to disguise as foreign-owned
rms and pay a lower tax tm. Despite the introduction of p from equation (4),
the rst-order condition of labor input [GL(Ld; D) = w] exactly corresponds to
HS (2010).
The government collects total tax revenues of
T = tm[(F (Lm;K) wLm)+ p(G(Ld; D) wLd)]+ td(1  p)[G(Ld; D) wLd)]:
(5)
From the zero-prot condition of mobile companies and the market clearing
condition of domestic labor, where supply is normalized to unity, we have
F = wL+ K; (6)
Lm(w; ) + Ld(w;D) = 1: (7)
The government sets up optimal policies by maximizing social welfare and
is restrained to set tax rates between zero and one. Following HS (2010),
there are two types of consumers: workers and entrepreneurs, who consume
all the productions in the market. Entrepreneurs act as the owners of do-
mestic rms. In addition, the government redistributes tax revenues from en-
trepreneurs to workers by giving workers all the tax revenues as a lump-sum
payment. Therefore, the aggregated consumption of workers Cw is: Cw =
w + T , while the aggregated consumption of entrepreneurs CE is given by
[(1   td)(1   p(TH)) + (1   tm)p(TH)](w). It is further supposed that the
total consumption CE of entrepreneurs is weighted by a parameter  in the
social welfare function,  < 1.
It follows that the government objective function is described as a weighted
sum of consumptions: 
 = Cw+CE . Since markets clear and total production
is consumed, i.e., Cw + CE = Y , the government maximizes social welfare by
choosing the optimal tax rates tm and td from:
maxftm;tdg : 
 (8)
s:t: :  =
r
1  tm ; (9)
Lm(w; ) + Ld(w;D) = 1: (10)
Since the total consumption 
 could be written as Y (1 )CE = F (Lm;K) 
rK +G(Ld; D)  (1  )[(1  td)(1  p(TH)) + (1  tm)p(TH)](w), we obtain
the following rst-order conditions:
@

@td
= (1  )(1  p)(w) > 0; (11)
@

@tm
=FK
@K
@
@
@tm
  r @K
@
@
@tm
  (1  )( p)(w)
 (1  )[(1  td)(1  p) + (1  tm)p] @
@w
@w
@
@
@tm
= 0:
(12)
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From (11), the optimal tax rate for domestic immobile rms is 100%.
A special case is the one without any tax haven: p(TH) = 0. The rst-order
conditions can then be simplied as:
@

@td
= (1  )(w) > 0; (13)
@

@tm
= FK
@K
@
@
@tm
  r @K
@
@
@tm
  (1  )(1  td) @
@w
@w
@
@
@tm
= 0: (14)
From (14) we obtain (  r)K = (1   )(1   td) @@w @w@ @@tm . From (13),
the optimal tax rate for domestic immobile rms will be set to 100% as well.
Consequently,  = r, which implies a zero tax rate on foreign companies. In
other words, when there is no tax haven, the government optimizes social welfare
by fully taxing immobile domestic rms, which have to bear the whole tax
burden.
The next step is to examine social welfare with respect to the number of tax
havens: assume now the government has already optimized tax rates tm and td
such that total welfare is optimized as well: 
(tm; t

d). Using the envelop the-
orem, the change in welfare that follows an increase in the fraction of domestic
rms p, which can pretend to be international, can be obtained as:
d

dp
=  (1  )(td   tm)(w) < 0: (15)
As a result, since by assumption dp(TH)=dTH > 0, tax havens have a negative
impact on social welfare. As indicated by (15), the negative e¤ect derives from
the fact that more domestic rms can pretend to be foreign and this leads to
a reduction of tax revenue measured by (td   tm)(w) and evaluated at the
di¤erential shadow price (1  ) of workersand entrepreneursincome.
Intuitively, we would expect that the possibility of some domestic rms to
hide in the pool of international rms will not only lead to a welfare loss for the
country under consideration. In addition, it is plausible that there is an upward
change in the optimal tax rate tm, as taxing the respective pool is partly a tax
on immobile (but round-tripping) investments. The appendix contains a proof
of this intuition based on linear labor and capital demand.
In a generalized setup, the probability p is naturally to be assumed as a
function not only of the number of tax havens, but also the di¤erence between
tax rates on domestic immobile and multinational mobile rms, denoted as
p(TH; td tm). In this case, the welfare function of the government is generalized
to be 
(tm; t

d) = F (Lm;K)  rK +G(Ld; D)  (1 )[(1  td)(1  p(TH; td 
tm))+(1  tm)p(TH; td  tm)](w). Based on the envelop theorem, the result of
(15) continues to hold and the above mentioned negative impact of tax havens
on social welfare prevails.
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6 Conclusions
A much cited argument claims that tax haven services may allow high tax
countries to di¤erentiate their tax rates between mobile international rms and
immobile national rms if such a di¤erentiation is not possible otherwise. The
present paper is motivated by (i) the observation that some countries, most no-
tably China, in the past have di¤erentiated their tax rates between domestic and
foreign rms and (ii) many countries have di¢ culties to tell apart national rms
from international rms because of a high suspected share of round-tripping
investments. Bringing together these two observations in an amended Hong-
Smart model reverses the conclusion that tax havens are good. However, under
the enforcement of base erosion and prot shifting (BEPS) conducted by OECD,
if tax rates are forced to be equalized on mobile international and immobile na-
tional rms, then the remaining non-cooperative tax havens could serve a new
role on high tax countries.
7 Appendix
From the analysis in section 5, we know that immobile companies that reveal
as such will always be taxed fully. Therefore, when tax havens are available,
immobile companies will have incentives to shift foreign and pretend to be a
multinational company. In order to obtain the optimal tax rate on mobile
companies, it is worth examining the rst-order conditions of the government
objective function with respect to the tax rate on mobile companies tm. The
following equation is simplied and ordered from the rst-order condition (14)
in section 5:
@

@tm
= (  r)C + (1  )p(w)  (1  )AB = 0; (16)
where:
A = (1  td)(1  p) + (1  tm)p; (17)
B =
@
@w
@w
@
@
@tm
; (18)
C = K
@
@tm
: (19)
Since the optimal tax rate on domestic rms td equals 1, A = (1  tm)p.
Moreover, according to the capital demand function of mobile companies:
 = r1 tm . The gross-of-tax user cost of capital  changes with the change of
tax rate on mobile companies tm accordingly:
@
@tm
=
r
(1  tm)2 =
2
r
: (20)
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Plugging A, B, C and the above derivative into equation (16), it could be
written as:
(  r)K 
2
r
+ (1  )p(w)  (1  )p @
@w
@w
@
= 0: (21)
Since r is dened (HS (2010)) as the xed rental price for capital in the
world market, equation (21) can be considered as a function of  and p. Taking
the total di¤erentiate of equation (21) on both sides one obtains the following:
[(1  r)K 
2
r
+ (  r)K 2
r
]d+ (  r)
2
r
Kd+ (1  )(w)dp
  (1  ) @
@w
@w
@
dp+ (1  )p @
@w
@w
@
d
  (1  )pw @w
@
d  (1  )p @
@w
wd  (1  )p @
@w
@w
@
d
= 0
(22)
Solving equation (22) gives us ddp :
d
dp
=
(1  )(w)  (1  )ww
 [(1  r)2r + 2(  r)r ]K   (  r)
2
r K + (1  )p(ww + ww)
(23)
In order to solve the problem for the optimal tax rate for multinational
companies, we need to solve (1  )(w) by using equation (16):
@

@tm
1
p
:  (  r)C
p
+
1  
p
AB = (1  )(w) (24)
By plugging (1  )(w) into equation (24), we obtain:
d
dp
=
 ( r)2
p K
 [(1  r)2 + 2(  r)]K   A^K + B^w + C^w
(25)
Where:
A^ = (  r)2 (26)
B^ = (1  )prw (27)
C^ = (1  )prw (28)
Equation (25) is positive if demand for capital and labour are linear. In other
words, K, w and w are all equal to zero. Under this condition, the gross-
of-tax user cost of capital  for foreign companies is positively correlated with
the probability of domestic companies shifting foreign, p. Since it is assumed
that the probability p(TH) is an increasing function of the number of tax havens
12
TH, the rent of capital monotonically increases with the number of tax havens
as well. Consequently, it proves that once tax rates are di¤erentiated, the more
tax havens available, the higher the optimal tax rate will be set on multinational
companies.
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